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Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE MISSION, ACTIVITIES, OVERSIGHT, AND BUDGET OF THE ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE

Wednesday, April 19, 2023

Washington, D.C.

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2 MISSION, ACTIVITIES, OVERSIGHT, AND BUDGET OF THE
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4

5 Wednesday, April 19, 2023
6

7 U.S. Senate
8 Subcommittee on Emerging
9 Threats and Capabilities
10 Committee on Armed Services
11 Washington, D.C.
12

13 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:08 a.m.
14 in Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon.
15 Kirsten E. Gillibrand, chairwoman of the subcommittee,
16 presiding.

17 Subcommittee Members Present: Senators Gillibrand
18 [presiding], Rosen, and Ernst.
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24 Page determined to be Unclassified
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IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)
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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, U.S.
2 SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

3 Senator Gillibrand: The hearing will come to order.

4 I would first like to thank our witness, Dr. Sean
5 Kirkpatrick, for testifying here and in today's earlier
6 closed session, and for his long and distinguished career
7 both in the intelligence community and in the Department of
8 Defense.

9 Dr. Kirkpatrick is the director of the All-Domain
10 Anomaly Resolution Office, or AARO. Congress established
11 this office in law to get to the bottom of the very serious
12 problem of unidentified anomalous phenomena, or UAP.

13 Dr. Kirkpatrick has a very difficult mission. While we
14 have made progress there remains a stigma attached to these
15 phenomenon. There is a vast and complex citizen engagement
16 and there is also very challenging scientific and technical
17 hurdles.

18 So we appreciate the willingness of Dr. Kirkpatrick to
19 lean in on this issue and the work that he has accomplished
20 thus far and we look forward to both his opening statement
21 and his presentation of examples of the work AARO has done.

22 In late 2017 media reports surfaced about activities
23 set in motion by the late long-serving Majority Leader
24 Senator Harry Reid more than a decade ago. We learned that
25 there was strong evidence of advanced technology reflected

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO
IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)

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1 in the features and performance characteristics of many
2 objects observed by our highly-trained service members
3 operating top of the line military equipment.

4 We learned that for at least the past eight years
5 military pilots frequently encountered unknown objects in
6 controlled airspace off both the East and West Coasts,
7 across the continental United States, in test and training
8 areas and ranges.

9 We do not know where they are -- they come from, who
10 made them, or how they operate. As former Deputy Secretary
11 of Defense David Norquist observed, had any of these objects
12 had the label made in China there would be an uproar in the
13 government and media. There would be no stone unturned and
14 no effort spared to find out what we were dealing with.

15 We can look at the recent incursion of the unidentified
16 PRC high-altitude balloon as an example and because of the
17 UFO stigma the response has been irresponsibly anemic and
18 slow.

19 Congress established AARO. We made it clear that we
20 expect vigorous action. We added very substantial initial
21 funding for the office. But despite our best efforts the
22 President's budget for fiscal years '23 and '24 requested
23 only enough funding to defray the operating expenses of
24 AARO.

25 It included almost no funds to sustain the critical

1 research and development necessary to support a serious
2 investigation. It took a letter to Secretary Austin from
3 Senator Rubio and me and 14 other senators to get the office
4 temporary relief for the current fiscal year.

5 In this hearing I intend to probe a series of specific
6 issues. In the recent incidents where multiple objects were
7 shot down over North America it seemed that Pentagon
8 leadership did not turn to AARO office to play a leading
9 role in advising the combatant commander.

10 We need to know whether this will continue. We need to
11 know whether the leadership in DOD will bring AARO into the
12 decision-making process in a visible way and we need to know
13 what role AARO will play in interagency coordination after
14 the NSC Working Group disbands.

15 In the fiscal year 2023 National Defense and
16 Intelligence Authorization Act Congress established a direct
17 reporting chain from the AARO director to the Deputy
18 Secretary of Defense.

19 The role of the Office of the Under Secretary of
20 Defense for Intelligence and Security is limited to
21 providing administrative support. We need to know how this
22 direction is being implemented.

23 UAP are frequently observed flying in extremely high or
24 very low speeds and come in various sizes and shapes.
25 During the recent shoot downs over North America DOD

1 disclosed that filters on radar systems were adjusted to
2 allow for detection and tracking of diverse sets of objects
3 for the first time. While opening the aperture can overload
4 the real-time analytic process we cannot keep turning a
5 blind eye to surveillance data that is critical to detecting
6 and tracking UAP.

7 We need to know whether Dr. Kirkpatrick could achieve
8 the necessary control over sensor filters and the storage
9 and access to raw surveillance data to find UAP anomalies.

10 Finally, one of the tasks Congress set for AARO is
11 serving as an open door for witnesses of UAP events or
12 participants in government activities related to UAPs to
13 come forward securely and disclose what they know without
14 fear of retribution for any possible violations of
15 previously signed nondisclosure agreements.

16 Congress mandated that AARO set up a publicly
17 discoverable and accessible process for safe disclosure.
18 While we know that AARO has already conducted a significant
19 number of interviews, many referred by Congress, we need to
20 set up a public process that -- and we need to know where
21 that effort stands.

22 With that, I would like to turn to Senator Ernst for
23 her opening statement.

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Page determined to be Unclassified
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JONI ERNST, U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA

2 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
3 Dr. Kirkpatrick, for your testimony today. I will keep
4 these remarks very brief so that we have maximum time for
5 your briefing.

6 The recent downing of the Chinese surveillance balloon
7 and three other objects underscores the need for domain
8 awareness. Adversaries like China and Russia are working to
9 hold U.S. interests, including our homeland, at risk. That
10 is why your testimony is so important and I so look forward
11 to a progress update on the establishment of your office.

12 As members know, your office evolved from the Navy-led
13 Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force to the All-Domain
14 Anomalous Resolution Office known as AARO.

15 Dr. Kirkpatrick, your extensive background in science
16 and technology, research and development, and space makes
17 you well suited to discuss these emerging challenges.

18 My priority is that we understand the full range of
19 threats posed by our adversaries in all domains. That is
20 what the joint force needs to be prepared to fight and win
21 in defense of our nation.

22 This committee needs to know about Chinese or Russian
23 advanced technology programs to exploit our vulnerabilities
24 and it needs to know whether your office, along with the IC,
25 has detected potential Chinese or Russian capabilities to

1 surveille or attack us.

2 Finally, we need to ensure efficient interagency
3 coordination. Multiple elements of the DOD and IC own a
4 piece of this mission. To add value, AARO's efforts cannot
5 be redundant with others.

6 Thank you again. We look forward to your testimony.

7 Senator Gillibrand: Dr. Kirkpatrick, you can give your
8 testimony.

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Page determined to be Unclassified
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IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)
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1 STATEMENT OF DR. SEAN M. KIRKPATRICK, DIRECTOR, ALL-
2 DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE

3 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Thank you, Chairwoman Gillibrand,
4 Ranking Member Ernst, and distinguished members of the
5 subcommittee. It is a privilege to be here today to testify
6 on the Defense -- Defense's efforts to address unidentified
7 anomalous phenomena.

8 First, I want to thank Congress for its extensive and
9 continued partnership as the department works to better
10 understand and respond to UAP in an effort to minimize
11 technical and intelligence surprise.

12 Unidentified objects in any domain pose potential risks
13 to safety and security, particularly from military personnel
14 and capabilities. Congress and DOD agree that UAP cannot
15 remain unexamined or unaddressed.

16 We are grateful for sustained congressional engagement
17 on this issue, which paved the way for the DOD's
18 establishment of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office in
19 July of last year.

20 Though AARO is still a young office, the spotlight on
21 UAP in recent months underscores the importance of its work
22 and the need for UAP to be taken seriously as a matter of
23 national security.

24 All leadership that I have had the pleasure of working
25 with, whether DOD, IC, DOE, civil, scientific, or industrial

1 view Congress as a critical partner in this endeavor. AARO
2 has accomplished much in the last nine months since it was
3 established. The AARO team of more than three dozen experts
4 is organized around four functional areas: operations,
5 scientific research, integrated analysis, and strategic
6 communications.

7 In the nine months since AARO's establishment we have
8 taken important steps to involve and improve UAP data
9 collection, standardize the department's UAP internal
10 reporting requirements, and implement a framework for
11 rigorous scientific and intelligence analysis, allowing us
12 to resolve cases in a systematic and prioritized manner.

13 Meanwhile, consistent with legislative direction, AARO
14 is also carefully reviewing and researching the U.S.
15 government's UAP-related historical record. AARO is leading
16 a focused effort to better characterize, understand, and
17 attribute UAP with priority given to UAP reports by DOD and
18 IC personnel in or near areas of national security
19 importance.

20 DOD fully appreciates the eagerness from many quarters,
21 especially here in Congress and in the American public, to
22 quickly resolve every UAP encountered across the globe from
23 the distant past through today.

24 It is important to note, however, AARO is the
25 culmination of decades of DOD, intelligence community, and

1 congressionally-directed efforts to successfully resolve UAP
2 encountered first and foremost by U.S. military personnel,
3 specifically Navy and Air Force pilots.

4 The law establishing AARO is ambitious and it will take
5 time to realize the full mission. We cannot answer decades
6 of questions about UAP all at once but we must begin
7 somewhere.

8 While I assure you that AARO will follow scientific
9 evidence wherever it leads, I ask for your patience as DOD
10 first prioritizes the safety and security of our military
11 personnel and installations in all domains.

12 After all, UAP encountered first by highly capable DOD
13 and IC platforms featuring the nation's most advanced
14 sensors are those UAP most likely to be resolved by my
15 office, assuming the data can be collected.

16 If AARO succeeds in first improving the ability of
17 military personnel to quickly and confidently resolve UAP
18 they encounter I believe that in time we will have greatly
19 advanced the capability of the entire United States
20 government, including its civilian agencies, to resolve UAP.

21 However, it would be naive to believe that the
22 resolution of all UAP can be solely accomplished by the DOD
23 and IC alone. We will need to prioritize collection and
24 leverage authorities for monitoring all domains within the
25 continental United States.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO
IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)
Date: 2/6/2025

1 AARO's ultimate success will require partnerships with
2 the interagency, industry partners, academia, and the
3 scientific community as well as the public.

4 AARO is partnering with the services, intelligence
5 community, DOE, as well as civil partners and across the
6 U.S. government to tap into the resources of the
7 interagency.

8 The UAP challenge is more an operational and scientific
9 issue than it is an intelligence issue. As such, we are
10 working with industry, academia, and the scientific
11 community which bring their own resources, ideas, and
12 expertise to this challenging problem set.

13 Robust collaboration and peer review across a broad
14 range of partners will promote greater objectivity and
15 transparency in the study of UAP.

16 I want to underscore today that only a very small
17 percentage of UAP reports display signatures that could
18 reasonably be described as anomalous. The majority of
19 unidentified objects reported to AARO demonstrate mundane
20 characteristics of balloons, unmanned aerial systems,
21 clutter, natural phenomena, or other readily explainable
22 sources.

23 While a large number of cases in our holdings remain
24 technically unresolved, this is primarily due to a lack of
25 data associated with those cases. Without sufficient data

1 we are unable to reach defensible conclusions that meet the
2 high scientific standards we set for resolution and I will
3 not close a case that I cannot defend the conclusions of.

4 I recognize that this answer is unsatisfying to those
5 who in good faith assume that what they see with their eyes,
6 with their cameras, and with their radars is
7 incontrovertible evidence of extraordinary characteristics
8 and performance.

9 Yet, time and again with sufficient scientific quality
10 data it is fact that UAP often but not always resolve into
11 readily explainable sources. Humans are subject to
12 deception and illusions, sensors to unexpected responses and
13 malfunctions and, in some cases, intentional interference.
14 Getting to the handful of cases that pass this level of
15 scrutiny is the mission of AARO.

16 That is not to say that UAP once resolved are no longer
17 of national security interest, however. On the contrary,
18 learning that a UAP is not of exotic origin but is instead
19 just a quadcopter or a balloon leads to the question of who
20 is operating that quadcopter and to what purpose. The
21 answers to those questions will inform potential national
22 security or law enforcement responses.

23 AARO is a member of the department's support to the
24 administration's Tiger Team effort to deal with
25 stratospheric objects such as the PRC high-altitude balloon.

1 When previously unknown objects are successfully identified
2 it is AARO's role to quickly and efficiently hand off such
3 readily explainable objects to the intelligence, law
4 enforcement, or operational safety communities for further
5 analysis and appropriate action.

6 In other words, AARO's mission is to turn UAP into SEP,
7 somebody else's problem. The U.S. government, the DOD, and
8 the IC in particular has tremendous capabilities to deal
9 with those encountered objects.

10 In the wake of the PRC HAB event the interagency is
11 working to better integrate and share information to address
12 identifiable stratospheric objects but that is not AARO's
13 lane.

14 Meanwhile, for the few cases in all domains -- space,
15 air, and sea -- that do demonstrate potentially anomalous
16 characteristics AARO exists to help the DOD, IC, and
17 interagency resolve those anomalous cases.

18 In doing so AARO is approaching these cases with the
19 highest level of objectivity and analytic rigor. This
20 includes physically testing and employing, modeling, and
21 simulation to validate our analyses and underlying theories,
22 then peer reviewing those results within the U.S.
23 government, industry partners, and appropriately cleared
24 academic institutions before reaching any conclusions.

25 I should also state clearly for the record that in our

1 research AARO has found no credible evidence thus far of
2 extraterrestrial activity, off world technology, or objects
3 that defy the known laws of physics.

4 In the event sufficient scientific data wherever
5 obtained that a UAP encountered can only be explained by
6 extraterrestrial origin, we are committed to working with
7 our interagency partners at NASA to appropriately inform
8 U.S. government's leadership of its findings.

9 For those few cases that have leaked to the public
10 previously and subsequently commented on by the U.S.
11 government I encourage those who hold alternative theories
12 or views to submit your research to credible peer-reviewed
13 scientific journals. AARO is working very hard to do the
14 same. That is how science works, not by blog or social
15 media.

16 We know that there is tremendous public interest in UAP
17 and a desire for answers from AARO. By its very nature the
18 UAP challenge has for decades lent itself to mystery,
19 sensationalism, and even conspiracy.

20 For that reason, AARO remains committed to
21 transparency, accountability, and to sharing as much with
22 the American public as we can consistent with our obligation
23 to protect not only intelligence sources and methods but
24 U.S. and allied capabilities.

25 However, AARO's work will take time if we are committed

1 to do it right. It means adhering to the scientific method
2 and the highest standards of research integrity. It means
3 being methodical and scrupulous. It means withholding
4 judgment in favor of evidence.

5 It means following the data where it leads wherever it
6 leads. It means establishing scientific peer-reviewed
7 theoretical underpinnings of observed data, and AARO is
8 committed to all of those standards.

9 I am proud of AARO's progress over the last nine
10 months. Much remains to be done but the hard work is
11 underway.

12 Thank you for your continued support, and before we
13 turn to questions I am going to walk you through some of our
14 analytical trends in a couple of cases that we have
15 prepared.

16 [Chart is shown.]

17 Mr. Kirkpatrick: So one of the things that AARO does
18 is high-integrity analysis, as I have said. This chart
19 represents the trend analysis of all the cases in AARO's
20 holdings to date.

21 What you will see on the left is a histogram of all of
22 our reported sightings as a function of altitude. So most
23 of our sightings occur in the 15,000- to 25,000-foot range
24 and that is ultimately because that is where a lot of our
25 aircraft are.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO
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1 On the far right upper corner you will see a breakout
2 of the morphologies of all of the UAP that are reported.
3 Over half, about 52 percent, of what has been reported to us
4 are round or spheres. The rest of those break out into all
5 kinds of different other shapes.

6 The gray box is, essentially, there is no data on what
7 its shape is. Either it was not reported or the sensor did
8 not collect it. The bottom map is a heat map of all
9 reporting areas across the globe that we have available to
10 us.

11 What you will notice is that there is a heavy what we
12 call collection bias both in altitude and in geographic
13 location. That is where all of our sensors exist. That is
14 where our training ranges are. That is where our
15 operational ranges are. That is where all of our platforms
16 are.

17 In the middle what we have done is reduce the most
18 typically reported UAP characteristics to these fields,
19 mostly round, mostly one to four meters, white, silver,
20 translucent, metallic 10,000 to 30,000 feet with apparent
21 velocities from stationary to Mach two.

22 No thermal exhausts are usually detected. We get
23 intermittent radar returns, we get intermittent radio
24 returns, and we get intermittent thermal signatures. That
25 is what we are looking for in trying to understand what that

1 is.

2 Next slide.

3 So I am going to walk you through two cases that we
4 have declassified recently. This first one is an MQ-9 in
5 the Middle East observing that blow up, which is an apparent
6 spherical object, via EO sensors. Those are not IR.

7 If you want to go ahead and click that and play it, you
8 will see it come through the top of the screen -- there it
9 goes -- and then the camera will slew to follow it. You
10 will see it pop in and out of the field of view there.

11 This is, essentially, all of the data we have
12 associated with this event from some years ago. It is going
13 to be virtually impossible to fully identify that just based
14 off of that video.

15 Now, what we can do and what we are doing is keeping
16 that as part of that group of 52 percent to see what are the
17 similarities, what are the trends across all these, do we
18 see these in a particular distribution, do they all behave
19 the same or not.

20 As we get more data we will be able to go back and look
21 at these in a fuller context. How are we going to get more
22 data? We are working with the joint staff to issue guidance
23 to all the services and commands that will then establish
24 what are the reporting requirements, the timeliness, and all
25 of the data that is required to be delivered to us and

1 retained from all the associated sensors.

2 That, historically, has not been the case and it has
3 been happenstance that data has been collected.

4 Next slide.

5 This particular event, South Asia MQ-9 looking at
6 another MQ-9, and what is highlighted there in that red
7 circle is an object that flies through the screen. Unlike
8 the previous one, this one actually shows some really
9 interesting things that everyone thought was truly anomalous
10 to start with.

11 First of all, it is a high-speed object that is flying
12 in the field of regard of two MQ-9s. Second, it appears to
13 have this trail behind it, which at first blush you would
14 think that looks like a propulsion trail.

15 In reality, if you want to play the first slide we will
16 show you what that looks like in real time, or first video.
17 So we are looking at that. There it goes. Why do you not
18 play it again and then pause it halfway through? Right
19 there. All right.

20 You might be able to see that trail there behind it.
21 That is actually not a real trail. That is a sensor
22 artifact. Each one of those little blobs is actually a
23 representation of the object as it is moving through, and
24 later in the video as the camera slews that trail actually
25 follows the direction of the camera, not the direction of

1 the object.

2 We pulled these apart frame by frame. We were able to
3 demonstrate that that is essentially a readout overlap of
4 the image. It is a shadow image. It is not real.

5 Further, if you later follow this all the way to end it
6 starts to resolve itself into that blob that is in that
7 picture in the top right and if you squint it looks like an
8 aircraft because it actually turns out to be an aircraft.
9 Go ahead and put that on.

10 So you will see the tail sort of pop out there and so
11 what you are looking at is -- this is in the infrared --
12 this is the heat signature off of the engines of a commuter
13 aircraft that happened to be flying in the vicinity of where
14 those two MQ-9s were at.

15 Why am I showing you this? So the first one that I
16 showed you we do not have resolved yet. That is an
17 unresolved case we are still studying. This one we can
18 resolve. But this is the kind of data that we have to work
19 with and the type of analysis that we have to do, which can
20 be quite extensive when you have to pull these apart frame
21 by frame.

22 Further, we are now matching all of this with the
23 models of all of those imaging sensors so that I can say --
24 I can recreate this. I can actually show how the sensor is
25 going to respond. All of these sensors do not necessarily

1 respond the way you think they do, especially out in the
2 world and in the field.

3 And I believe that is all I have and I will open it up
4 for your questions.

5 [The prepared statement of Mr. Kirkpatrick follows:]

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Page determined to be Unclassified
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IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)
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1 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you so much, Dr.
2 Kirkpatrick.

3 Can you just give us some raw numbers of how many UAPs
4 you have analyzed, how many have been resolved, and sort of
5 in what buckets and then how many are still left to be
6 resolved? Just an update from your January public report
7 where it was 366 or something and about 150 were balloons
8 and about two dozen were drones. Just give us an update if
9 you have one.

10 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Sure. So as of this week we are
11 tracking over -- a total of 650 cases. Now, the report in
12 January basically said about half of the ones at that time,
13 about 150, were balloon -- were likely balloon like or
14 something like that. That does not mean they are resolved.

15 Senator Gillibrand: Oh, I see.

16 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Okay. So what -- let me walk
17 everyone through what our analytic process looks like.

18 We have, essentially, a five-step process. So we have
19 -- we get our cases in with all the data. We create a case
20 for that event. My team does a preliminary scrub of all of
21 those cases as they come in to sort out do we have any
22 information that says this is in one of those likely
23 categories -- it is likely a balloon, it is likely a balloon
24 -- a bird, it is likely some other object or we do not know.
25 Then we prioritize those based off of where they are.

1 Are they attached to a national security area? Does it show
2 some anomalous phenomenology that is of interest? If it is
3 just -- if it is just a spherical thing that is floating
4 around with the -- with the wind and it has no payload on it
5 that is going to be less important than something that has a
6 payload on it, which will be less important than something
7 that is maneuvering.

8 So there is sort of a hierarchy of just binning the
9 priorities because we cannot do all of them at once. Once
10 we do that and we prioritize them we take that package of
11 data in that case, and I have set up two teams. Think of
12 this as a red team, blue team, or competitive analysis.

13 I have an intelligence community team made up of
14 intelligence analysts and I have an S&T team made up of
15 scientists and engineers and the people that actually build
16 a lot of these sensors or physicists because if you are a
17 physicist you can do anything and -- but they are not
18 associated with the intel community. They are not intel
19 officers. They look at this through the lens of the sensor
20 of what the data says.

21 We give that package to both teams. The intelligence
22 community is going to look at it through the lens of the
23 intelligence record and what they assess and their intel
24 tradecraft, which they have very specific rules and
25 regulations on how they do that.

Page determined to be Unclassified
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1 The scientific community, technical community, is going
2 to look at it through the lens of what is the data telling
3 me, what is the sensor doing, what would I expect a sensor
4 response to be, and back that out.

5 Those two groups give us their answers. We then
6 adjudicate. If they agree then I am more likely to close
7 that case if they agree on what it is. If they disagree we
8 will have an adjudication. We will bring them together. We
9 will take a look at the differences. We will adjudicate why
10 do you say one thing and you say another.

11 We will then come to a case -- a recommendation. That
12 will get written up by my team. That then goes to a senior
13 technical advisory group, which is outside of all of those
14 people made up of senior technical folks and intel analysts
15 and operators from retired, out of the community, and they
16 essentially peer review what that case recommendation is.

17 They write their recommendations. That comes back to
18 me. I review it, we make a determination, and I will sign
19 off one way or the other and then that will go out as the
20 case determination.

21 Once we have an approved web portal to hang the
22 unclassified stuff we will -- we would downgrade and
23 declassify things and put it out there.

24 In the meantime, we are putting a lot of these on our
25 classified web portal where we can then collaborate with the

1 rest of the community so they can see what is going on.

2 In a nutshell, that is the process. So because of
3 that, that takes time. So of those over 650 we have
4 prioritized about half of them to be of anomalous
5 interesting value and now we have to go through those and
6 go, how much do I have actual data for because if all I have
7 is an operator report that says I saw X, Y, or Z, my
8 assessment is A, B, or C, that is not really sufficient.

9 That is a good place to start but I have to have data.
10 I have to have radar data. I have to have EO data. I have
11 to have thermal data. I have to have overhead data, and we
12 need to look at all that.

13 Now, from a big picture perspective I still have --
14 that is all -- they are still very valuable data and we are
15 looking at applying a lot of things -- new tools, analytic
16 tools, like natural language processing. So I can go across
17 all of those reports and look for commonalities.

18 How many of them are being described as round spherical
19 objects that are maneuvering? How many of them are not
20 maneuvering? How many of them seem to have a plume to it or
21 note? That is also going to be very valuable to give us
22 more of a global picture and a trends analysis of what are
23 we seeing and help us get to the determination.

24 So to go back to your question, ma'am, we have -- this
25 next quarterly report will be coming out here pretty soon.

1 Our next annual report you all have given us -- moved it up
2 to June, July -- we are going to be having that done about
3 that timeframe and we will have a -- we will be combining a
4 whole number of reports into that one.

5 I think we are currently sitting at around -- if I
6 remember correctly, we are around 20 to 30-ish or about
7 halfway through that analytic process. A handful of them
8 have made it all the way out to the other side, gone through
9 peer review. We have got case closure reports done and
10 signed.

11 We are going to get faster as we get more people on
12 board and we get more of the community tools to automate
13 some of the analysis that has to be done.

14 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you, Dr. Kirkpatrick.

15 Senator Ernst?

16 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Madam Chair.

17 And Dr. Kirkpatrick, the ODNI annual threat assessment
18 states that China's space activities are designed to erode
19 U.S. influence across military, technological, economic, and
20 diplomatic spheres.

21 Likewise, Russia will remain a key space competitor.
22 In the course of your work have you become aware of any
23 Chinese or Russia technical advancements to surveille or
24 attack U.S. interests?

25 Mr. Kirkpatrick: That is a great question. Part of

1 what we have to do as we go through these, especially the
2 ones that show signatures of advanced technical
3 capabilities, is determine if there is a foreign nexus.
4 That is really hard if what we observe does not have a
5 Chinese or Russian flag on the side of it.

6 Now, I think it is prudent to say of the -- of the
7 cases that are showing some sort of advanced technical
8 signature of which we are talking single percentages of the
9 entire population of cases we have. I am concerned about
10 what that nexus is and I have indicators that some are
11 related to foreign capabilities.

12 We have to investigate that with our IC partners and as
13 we get evidence to support that that gets then handed off to
14 the appropriate IC agency to investigate. Again, it becomes
15 an SEP at that point.

16 Senator Ernst: Yeah, somebody else's problem.

17 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Right.

18 Senator Ernst: Very good. Thank you. Yes.

19 Is it possible that the Chinese or Russian advanced
20 technologies could be causing some of these anomalous
21 behaviors? And you said there seems to be some indicators.
22 So just for us today could you describe a potential threat
23 that might exist out there if they are of foreign nexus?

24 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Sure. In order to do this research
25 appropriately we have to also be cognizant of what is the

1 state of the art in development across the S&T community.

2 What is -- what are the DARPA's of the world doing? What are
3 our -- what is the horizon scanning of emerging technologies
4 appropriate to this subcommittee?

5 What is happening out there, and if somebody could
6 accelerate that capability how would that manifest itself
7 and what would it look like and do those signatures match
8 what we are seeing?

9 There are emerging capabilities out there that in many
10 instances Russia and China -- well, China in particular are
11 on par or ahead of us in some areas.

12 So previously I used to be the Defense Department's
13 intelligence officer for science and technical intelligence.
14 That was our job was to look for what does all that look
15 like. And then my last several years, of course, in Space
16 Command doing space.

17 The adversary is not waiting. They are advancing and
18 they are advancing quickly. If I were to put on some of my
19 old hats I would tell you they are less risk averse at
20 technical advancement than we are. They are just willing to
21 try things and see if it works.

22 Are there capabilities that could be employed against
23 us in both and ISR and a weapons fashion? Absolutely. Do I
24 have evidence that they are doing it in these cases? No,
25 but I have concerning indicators.

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO
IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)
Date: 2/6/2025

1 Senator Ernst: Thank you. I appreciate that and that
2 is why it is so important that you are working with the
3 intelligence community as well because you have the science,
4 the data background, but you also need to know from various
5 sources what adversaries may be working on, correct?

6 Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you,
7 Madam Chair.

8 Senator Gillibrand: Senator Rosen?

9 Senator Rosen: Well, thank you, Chair Gillibrand,
10 Ranking Member Ernst. This is a really important hearing.

11 I would like to thank you, Dr. Kirkpatrick, for your
12 service to the country and as a former systems analyst
13 myself I really appreciate your flowchart, the description
14 of the process, and particularly the trends analysis, going
15 forward, how that is going to help us and you talked about
16 language, the large LLMs -- the large language models of
17 artificial intelligence. That is really going to help us in
18 the hunt forward, predictive analysis, I think, to some of
19 your point what we worry about.

20 But I want to focus on Nevada because I want to talk
21 about the impact of UAPs on aviation safety. So when it
22 comes to unidentified aerial phenomenal -- phenomena, excuse
23 me -- one of my first concerns is really about the safety of
24 Nevada's military aviator.

25 So we have airmen stationed at Nellis Air Force Base,

1 naval aviators flying at Naval Air Station Fallon, and
2 service members across -- from across the world training at
3 the Nevada test and training range. I know you know all
4 this.

5 And, unfortunately, the existence of advanced UAPs in
6 the U.S. airspace and over U.S. military installations not a
7 new phenomenon. The Navy has officially acknowledged that
8 between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses occurred involving UAPs
9 that required pilot action and follow-up reports.

10 As a result, in 2019 the Navy established a protocol
11 for pilots to report on their dangerous encounters. So
12 could you speak to any ongoing efforts within DOD to ensure
13 the safety of our aviators with a potential UAP encounter
14 and what is your relationship with NORTHCOM, NORAD, SPACECOM
15 when it comes to this immediate real-time response and how
16 -- they are there right there in the moment, right?

17 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Absolutely. That is a great
18 question.

19 So let me start with my relationship with the commands
20 are very good. I just came back from sitting down with
21 General VanHerck and all the all the J staff out at NORTHCOM
22 a couple weeks ago talking through exactly what we need to
23 do to help them get their arms around this.

24 We are also working very closely with Joint Staff and
25 the Joint Staff has just been very outstanding in helping

1 work through policy and guidance issues to the forces and to
2 the services, and I would like to just make sure that we
3 message back to all of the operators the importance of their
4 reporting and the fact that you are about to get a bunch of
5 new requirements that we are issuing through the Joint Staff
6 on all of the data that we are going to need you to save and
7 report back to us.

8 It is invaluable and we are working to try to take the
9 most advantage of that to learn what it is that we are
10 trying to mitigate.

11 To get directly to your question, the first thing that
12 we are doing is normalizing our reporting. We are
13 standardizing our reporting and the requirements associated
14 with that.

15 Guidance from the Joint Staff, I think, goes out maybe
16 this week, maybe next week, that we have been working with
17 them for some months that does exactly what I just said. It
18 gives them timelines. It gives them requirements. It gives
19 them here is all the data you have to have and you have got
20 to retain it.

21 The next thing that comes after that is a plan ord that
22 will go out to the commands for mitigation and response. So
23 there is a couple of things that we have to do.

24 One, I need to work with the commands and with the IC
25 and with our -- outside of our DOD and IC partners to extend

1 our collection posture targeted at some of these key areas
2 that you saw on that heat map that have a lot of activity so
3 that we can turn on extra collection when an operator sees
4 something.

5 So part of this is generating as a response function in
6 what we call a tactic technique and procedure for an
7 operator when he sees something, calls back to the
8 operations floor. They can turn on additional collection.
9 What does that collection look like? How do I bring all
10 that together so I can get more data on what is that thing?

11 Senator Rosen: Can I ask really quickly --

12 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Sure.

13 Senator Rosen: -- do you have the authorities you need
14 to extend your collection posture between agencies or
15 branches of the military? Because that seems to me to maybe
16 be a sticking point. I know my time is just about up.

17 I would love to follow up about your risk management
18 methodologies for some of these. But do you need any
19 authorities that you do not have to get the data you need?

20 Mr. Kirkpatrick: There are some authorities that we
21 need. We currently are operating under Title 10 authorities
22 but we have good relationships across the other agencies.
23 But having additional authorities for collection tasking,
24 counter-intelligence --

25 Senator Rosen: That is something --

1 Mr. Kirkpatrick: -- those are all things that would be
2 helpful, yes.

3 Senator Rosen: Thank you.

4 Senator Gillibrand: To follow up, Dr. Kirkpatrick,
5 will you help us write that language so we can put it in the
6 defense bill this year so that we know what authorities you
7 need?

8 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Mmm-hmm. We can do that.

9 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

10 We are going to start a second round. So if you want
11 to stay you can ask another round. I have at least three
12 more questions.

13 Senator Rosen: I have about a million more questions.

14 Senator Gillibrand: Do you want to -- do you want to
15 go right now so you -- in case you have to leave?

16 Senator Rosen: I feel like I do.

17 Senator Gillibrand: Yeah, go ahead.

18 Senator Rosen: And if you could do that that would be
19 great. I am going to stay on the drones issue because,
20 obviously, of the Air Force Base. We talked about those in
21 -- the last category is the Chinese spy balloon. It did
22 cross through the U.S. airspace, shot down by a Sidewinder
23 missile fired from an F-22.

24 Sidewinders costs us close to half a million dollars
25 each. So given the cost of these missiles, the cost per

1 flight, all of these other things, like I said, a follow-up
2 from the authorities or methodologies to data collection.
3 They can help us in other ways.

4 But how do you think we can develop a sustainable
5 affordable response to UAPs where we need to that may --
6 that will definitely violate our airspace -- not may,
7 definitely violate our airspace every chance that they can
8 get because they are adversaries. They want this
9 information.

10 So what do you think some cost effective measures might
11 be that we can get what we need out of that or take them
12 down, whatever is appropriate -- whatever the appropriate
13 measure is? Let us put it that way.

14 Mr. Kirkpatrick: So that is actually wrapped into the
15 plan ord that we are working with Joint Staff to send out --
16 what do the commands need from both a capabilities
17 perspective for kinetic and nonkinetic engagements, what are
18 the response functions of the particular wings or Navy, what
19 have you, and then what authorities do they need.

20 So one of the -- one of the challenges that we have
21 seen is there is an authorities issues with the -- with the
22 owners, operators of those ranges that they need to work
23 through and we are working that with the Joint Staff and
24 OSD.

25 So big picture we need to do all that. If you want to

1 get down to the specifics for -- there are nonkinetic
2 options to engage pretty much everything whether it is
3 electronic warfare, whether it is laser technologies --

4 Senator Rosen: That is where this data --

5 Mr. Kirkpatrick: That is right.

6 Senator Rosen: Having the good data collection,
7 predictive analytics, you can --

8 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Correct. Inform --

9 Senator Rosen: -- possibly make some assumptions on
10 possibilities.

11 Mr. Kirkpatrick: That is right, and we will inform
12 recommendations back to the department on here is what could
13 work, here is what we have seen work, here is what does not
14 work.

15 Senator Rosen: Thank you so much. Thank you, Madam
16 Chair. Appreciate it.

17 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you very much.

18 I just want to just talk a little bit about your
19 logistics, who you report to, how that is going, whether you
20 need different reporting lines.

21 By congressional legislation your office is
22 administratively located with the office of the Under
23 Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Security but you are
24 not substantively subordinate to the under secretary.

25 Rather, you are a direct report to the deputy

1 secretary. Are you taking direction directly from the
2 deputy secretary? Are you able to meet and brief the deputy
3 secretary? Is the office of USDINS working with you to have
4 the right framework?

5 Mr. Kirkpatrick: So USDINS and the -- I currently
6 report to USDINS until they come up with the plan for how
7 they are going to implement legislation.

8 DOD and DNI are working through that now. I would have
9 to refer you back to USDINS on what their plan is.

10 Senator Gillibrand: Do I need to update your reporting
11 structure in the next defense bill or is this something that
12 you think will work its way out or does it need further
13 clarity?

14 Mr. Kirkpatrick: I think they are planning on coming
15 back to you with an answer on what that plan is and I think
16 at that time that will inform what you want to do.

17 Senator Gillibrand: Okay. Thank you.

18 As you know, Dr. Kirkpatrick, Congress has mandated
19 that your office establish a discoverable and accessible
20 electronic method for potential witnesses of UAP incidents
21 and potential participants in government UAP-related
22 activities to contact your office and tell their stories.

23 Congress also set up a process whereby people are
24 subject to nondisclosure agreements preventing them from
25 disclosing what they may have witnessed or participated in

1 could tell you what they know without risk of retribution
2 from the -- or violation of their NDAs.

3 Have you submitted a public-facing website product for
4 approval to your superiors and how long has it been under
5 review?

6 Mr. Kirkpatrick: I have. We submitted the first
7 version of that before Christmas.

8 Senator Gillibrand: And do you have an estimate from
9 them when they will respond and when you will have feedback
10 on that?

11 Mr. Kirkpatrick: No, I do not.

12 Senator Gillibrand: Okay. We will author a letter
13 asking for that timely response to your superiors.

14 When do you expect that you will establish a public-
15 facing discoverable and access portal for people to use to
16 contact your office as the law requires?

17 Mr. Kirkpatrick: So I would like to, first, say thank
18 you all very much for referring the witnesses that you have
19 thus far to us. I appreciate that. We have brought in
20 nearly two dozen so far. It has been very helpful.

21 I would ask that you continue to do that until we have
22 an approved plan. We have a multi-phased approach for doing
23 that that we have been socializing and have submitted for
24 approval sometime. Once that happens then we should be able
25 to push all that out and get this a little more automated.

1 Senator Gillibrand: Great.

2 Mr. Kirkpatrick: What I would ask, though, is as you
3 all continue to refer to us and refer witnesses to us I
4 would appreciate if you do that. Please try to prioritize
5 the ones that you want to do because we do have a small
6 research staff dealing with that.

7 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you. And then do you have
8 any plans for public engagement that you want to share now
9 that you think it is important that the public knows what
10 the plan is?

11 Mr. Kirkpatrick: So we have a number of public
12 engagement recommendations, according to our strategic plan.
13 All of those have been submitted for approval. They have to
14 be approved by USDINS. We are waiting for approval to go do
15 that.

16 Senator Gillibrand: Okay. I will follow up on that.

17 And then my last question is about the integration of
18 department's UAP operations, research, analysis, and
19 strategic communications. During the recent UAP incidents
20 over North America it did not appear that you were allowed
21 to play that role.

22 Do you agree that the public perception is generally
23 that you and your office did not appear to play a major role
24 in the department's response to the detection of objects
25 over North America?

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO
IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)
Date: 2/6/2025

1 What can you tell us that is going on behind the scenes
2 from your perspective, and in the after action assessment
3 process is there awareness that there is a need to operate
4 differently in the future and a commitment to doing so?

5 Mr. Kirkpatrick: When the -- when the objects were
6 first detected I got called by Joint Staff leadership to
7 come in late one night to review events as they were
8 unfolding and to give them an assessment based on what we
9 knew at that time.

10 I did that. I worked with the director of Joint Staff,
11 the J2 and the J3 that night and over the couple of
12 following days on what are the types of things that we are
13 tracking from an unidentified object perspective, what
14 databases do we use those sorts of things for known objects,
15 known tracking.

16 Beyond that, the response I would have to -- I would
17 have to refer you back to the White House for the decision
18 on how they did the response. We did not play a role in
19 what you would respond other than that initial advice on
20 what we are seeing and how we are seeing it.

21 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

22 Senator Ernst?

23 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Madam Chair.

24 Dr. Kirkpatrick, I know that your office has gotten a
25 lot of attention recently and, of course, any new agency

1 there tends to be a push to increase size and funding. We
2 want to make sure that you are able to meet your goals.

3 But what I also need to ensure is that we are not
4 duplicating or replicating existing functions and creating
5 redundancy within DOD and the interagency.

6 So what steps are you taking right now to make sure
7 that your particular office and function is unique to any of
8 the other agencies that might be involved in these types of
9 cases?

10 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Yeah, that is a great question.

11 So I would like to lay down here is one of my -- sort
12 of my mission and my goal and my vision here. So the vision
13 is at one point -- at some point in the future you should
14 not need an AARO.

15 If I am successful in what I am doing we should be able
16 to normalize everything that we are doing into existing
17 processes, functions, agencies, and organizations and make
18 that part of their mission and their role.

19 Right now, the niche that we form is really going after
20 the unknowns. If you -- I think you articulated it early on
21 this is a hunt mission for what might somebody be doing in
22 our backyard that we do not know about.

23 All right. Well, that is what we are doing. But at
24 some point we should be able to normalize that. That is why
25 it is so important the work we are doing with Joint Staff to

1 normalize that into DOD policy and guidance.

2 We are bringing in all of our interagency partners. So
3 NASA is providing a liaison for us. I have FBI liaison. I
4 have OSI liaison. I have service liaisons. Half of my
5 staff come from the IC. Half of my staff come from other
6 scientific and technical backgrounds. I have DOE.

7 And so what we are trying to do is ensure, again, as I
8 make UAP into SEP they get handed off to the people that
9 that is their mission to go do so that we are not
10 duplicating that.

11 I am not going to go chase the Chinese high-altitude
12 balloon, for example. That is not my job. It is not an
13 unknown and it is not anomalous anymore. Now it goes over
14 to them.

15 Senator Ernst: Very good. Thank you, Madam Chair.

16 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

17 I want to just follow up on the filters for
18 surveillance. Outside observers have speculated that DOD
19 sets filters on certain sensors to eliminate objects that
20 are moving really fast or slow because what we are looking
21 for militarily are conventional aircraft and missiles. UAP
22 that does not fit into these programs would thereby be
23 weeded out and never noticed.

24 This speculation was proven to be true during the UAP
25 incidents over North America where DOD publicly acknowledged

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO
IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841(a)(1)(C)

Date: 2/6/2025

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1 that we were able to start seeing these UAPs only when we
2 opened up these filters.

3 Obviously, our military operators cannot be overloaded
4 with objects that are not conventional aircraft or missiles.

5 Can you nonetheless make sure that the raw data is being
6 captured and subsequently processed so that your office
7 knows what is really out there and is that going to cost
8 money? Will you expect to pay for that money out of AARO's
9 budget?

10 Mr. Kirkpatrick: One of the key tenets that we are
11 trying to do in our science plan is understand what those
12 signatures are. So we get all the raw, for example, radar
13 data prior to the scrubbing and filtering to allow it to
14 enter into our weapon systems and our detection systems.

15 We are now taking all that data and cross correlating
16 it to what pilots are saying they are seeing or other
17 observations from other operators.

18 What that allows us to do is then see if there are any
19 signatures in that data that I can pull out, generate what
20 we will call automatic target recognition algorithms that
21 allow us to then use that signature associated with a
22 observed UAP whatever that UAP may be.

23 We will then make those recommendations of what those
24 changes should be back to the department. So the deputy
25 secretary had asked me last October to make those

1 recommendations, what changes do we need to make to radars,
2 to platforms, to detection systems and algorithms, to pull
3 on those algorithms and make those changes. That is going
4 to take some time.

5 That is where the research and development comes in.
6 It is not -- it is not instantaneous. Right now, a lot of
7 the -- I will not say a lot of the things that fall outside
8 of the ranges of those filters have been identified by
9 people in the loop and you cannot have people in the loop
10 all the time. It is just not cost effective.

11 So part of our budget is working through what does that
12 look like and then making those recommendations back to the
13 big program offices for them to put into -- changes in
14 acquisition.

15 Senator Gillibrand: My last question is about the
16 academic community. Can you give us an update on sort of
17 how you collaborate with the academic community and whether
18 -- how the independent study being done by NASA complements
19 AARO's work?

20 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Sure.

21 Two questions so I will try to make it quick. In 1979
22 Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims require extraordinary
23 evidence. I would go one step further and I would say
24 extraordinary claims require not only extraordinary evidence
25 but extraordinary science and so how do you do that?

1 You do that with the scientific method. So as AARO is
2 developing and implementing its science plan it has to do so
3 grounded in a solid foundation of scientific theory across
4 the entire range of hypotheses that have been presented for
5 what UAP are.

6 That range spans adversary breakthrough technology, on
7 one hand, known objects and phenomena in the middle, all the
8 way to the extreme theories of extraterrestrials.

9 All of that has physics-based signatures associated
10 with it, whether it is theoretical from the academic
11 community known from things like hypersonic weapons or
12 adversary breakthrough technologies, as we have talked about
13 before, or the known objects that we have to go measure.

14 The idea is across that entire range you have to come
15 up with peer-reviewed scientific basis for all of it. The
16 academic community plays a very big role on the -- one end
17 of the spectrum, the intelligence community on the other end
18 of the spectrum, and then measurement in the middle.

19 Once I have those signatures identified in validated
20 peer-reviewed documents then I have something to point to
21 for all that data because all that data is going to match
22 one of those signatures, and then I can go, well, it is that
23 and not that or it is that, and that helps us go through all
24 that.

25 Where NASA comes in and the study that they are doing,

1 which I am supporting, is really looking at the unclassified
2 data sources that might be used to augment our classified
3 data sources to understand if there is a signature there we
4 can pull on. So very similar to the radars but civil
5 capability.

6 For example, we have a lot of climate science
7 satellites, for example, that look at Earth. Lots of them.

8 How many of those is the data valuable in seeing these
9 kinds of objects? The challenge in that is those platforms
10 do not necessarily have the resolution you need.

11 If you remember the slide I put up there with the
12 trends, the size of the objects we are looking for are
13 typically reported to be one to four meters.

14 Well, the resolution of many of the climate science
15 civil satellites is much larger than that, which means you
16 would have a hard time picking out something that is smaller
17 than a pixel on the imagery on the data.

18 That is not to say all of it is not useful and there
19 are ways of pulling through that data and going through.
20 That is what NASA is focused on right now is what is -- what
21 are some other data sources that could be used.

22 In addition, things like open source and crowd sourcing
23 of data -- we are exploring public-private partnerships,
24 ma'am, as you know -- we have talked about it in the past --
25 to look at is there a way to smartly crowd source additional

1 data that might be useful to augment some of my classified
2 sources and what does that look like and how would we do it
3 so that we are not overwhelmed by everybody who wants to
4 take a picture of everything.

5 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you.

6 Is there anything -- is there anything else you would
7 like to tell the committee before we close?

8 Or do you have another round?

9 Senator Ernst: No.

10 Senator Gillibrand: Yeah. Do you have anything else
11 you would like to tell the committee before we close?

12 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Thank you very much for allowing us
13 to come and share a little bit of insight into what AARO is
14 up to and what we are doing.

15 I hope to be able to share a whole lot more in the
16 future. We have a lot of work to do. So if you do not hear
17 from me outside it is because we have got a lot of work to
18 do.

19 Senator Gillibrand: Thank you so much, Dr.
20 Kirkpatrick. Thank you for the hearing.

21 Mr. Kirkpatrick: Thank you.

22 Audience Member: Excuse me. I drove 600 miles to come
23 here. I -- and I presented a book to David Spergel, who I
24 know is associated with the gentleman here. But I do not
25 have flying saucers. We just saw the first one. They had

1 no explanation for it. I would like to provide the evidence
2 for it. It is on my video, as well as ancient evidence of
3 cave drawings that look identical to that disc.

4 And what that would tell us is what [inaudible] and the
5 corporal has been saying. Assuming that they are coming
6 here is the assumption. A terrible thing to do. If we can
7 prove that they have always existed then they are not
8 changing in model, size, appearance, then it would answer
9 the question of these people in the sky have always
10 [inaudible].

11 But I have had to struggle trying to get the evidence
12 we saved and I did contact Neil deGrasse Tyson and he
13 informed me with an email, which I put in my book and about
14 these crafts. I find them and film them and send them to
15 everybody I can.

16 He told me to literally take them to the proper
17 authorities and that I could get my evidence looked at and
18 that is what I am doing today. I drove all the way from
19 Ohio, Mr. Kirkpatrick.

20 Senator Gillibrand: Dr. Kirkpatrick is the person --
21 the perfect person to give your evidence to --

22 Audience Member: Yeah, I appreciate it.

23 Senator Gillibrand: -- and eventually we will have a
24 website where you could just submit it and not have to go
25 600 miles. Today, since you are here, please submit your

1 evidence to Dr. Kirkpatrick and if you have copies we will
2 take your copies.

3 Audience Member: I have footage. I have grown up in
4 Albuquerque, New Mexico.

5 Audience Member: Same here.

6 Audience Member: I have on my phone three different
7 examples of glowing dots flying in circles or going over
8 Sandia Labs and Kirkland Air Force Base.

9 Senator Gillibrand: Yeah. Yes.

10 Audience Member: They have come down frequently and
11 consistently and loiter over our advanced weapons and
12 manufacturing industry, monitor it using advanced means like
13 the --

14 Senator Gillibrand: Yeah. We are very interested in
15 that data.

16 Audience Member: The vehicles tend to be about 10
17 meters in size and the data that Dr. Kirkpatrick gave about
18 the signatures of one to three gigahertz is the propulsion
19 field interacting with the atmospheric water -- the water in
20 the atmosphere.

21 The higher gigahertz range comes from the effects of
22 the propulsion field reducing the initial mass of the craft
23 so they can do these outstanding maneuvers of [inaudible]
24 degrees or rotating and flying off at hypersonic velocity.

25 There is knowledge within the weapons industry. More

1 people need to come forward. We need to pull up engineers
2 out of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and allow them the freedom
3 to speak and stop the secrecy. Thank you for hearing me.

4 Senator Gillibrand: My office can be a clearinghouse
5 for this information.

6 Audience Member: Yes, Ms. Gillibrand. I have got
7 video of it.

8 Senator Gillibrand: If you want to submit to me the
9 names and the people that you want Dr. Kirkpatrick has
10 contacts. I can do that, and any video that you want to
11 give us, eventually we will have a platform so this can be
12 done automatically. But I could [inaudible] and give it to
13 Dr. Kirkpatrick. If you have it on a DVD --

14 Audience Member: I want to thank you.

15 Senator Gillibrand: -- to get it to him directly.

16 Audience Member: I am a Marine so my hearing is a
17 little blunt. So if I could leave this with you --

18 Senator Gillibrand: Yes.

19 Audience Member: -- and somebody can give it to Dr.
20 Kirkpatrick would be great.

21 Senator Gillibrand: Yes.

22 Audience Member: That is my whole point. I just leave
23 it on this desk?

24 Senator Gillibrand: Yeah. Yeah. I will take it --

25 Audience Member: I appreciate it. Thank you so much

1 for looking into it.

2 Senator Gillibrand: Do you have a card? We have to
3 give our business cards to the chair. The first draft and
4 then [inaudible] are you done with it?

5 Staff: Sure.

6 Senator Gillibrand: Yeah. Why don't you take it since
7 you are actually going to -- I am going to give it to Dr.
8 Kirkpatrick and then [inaudible].

9 [Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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Page determined to be Unclassified
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